12/29/2023 0 Comments Irad kimhi philosophyFor on his account, " p" changes significance according to whether it occurs outside or inside the intensional context of indirect discourse (12, 123). Frege's account of indirect discourse seems to make this well nigh impossible. ![]() This requires recognizing the same proposition as occurring both in "extensional contexts" like "not- p", in which it occurs asserted, and in "intensional contexts" like "A believes not- p", in which it occurs unasserted. He contends that the defining task of "philosophical logic" is to entitle ourselves to their obvious validity (10). Kimhi calls the logical patterns belonging in this group the "syllogisms of thinking and being" (10, 111, 122-123). Consider such ordinary patterns of inference as the following: Did Wittgenstein blunder then? Kimhi suggests otherwise. In a different tradition, one would find the notion of "intentional being" invoked at this juncture.ΔΆ. On this standard Fregean account (whether it is actually Frege's or not), to think is to stand in a certain relation to such a being. Thus, if what one says, in fact, is not, what one says still has being in a different sense, namely the being of a thought. In order to beat all (i.e., to have the logical unity apart from which it would not exist in the first place), it need not be put forward as true, let alone be true. The asserted content of an assertion is distinct from its assertoric force. A Fregean "thought" ( Gedanke), insofar as it is the sense ( Sinn) of an assertion ( Aussage), is there to be thoughtwhether or not it is grasped or judged to be true by anyone, and whether or not it is in fact true. Consider the puzzle of falsehood, as raised by Parmenides. Once sorted out along these broadly Fregean lines, the puzzles indiscriminately raised by Wittgenstein prove to be readily amenable to Fregean solutions. Third, they may seem to fail to separate the psychological from the logical, thereby suggesting that the laws governing the recognition of truth are continuous with the laws governing truth. Second, these formulations may seem to conflate negation, a truth-functional logical connective, with propositional attitudes like wishing and hoping, thereby obfuscating the difference between so-called "extensional" contexts and "intensional" ones. Construed in the latter way (that is to say, de dicto), it raises the puzzle of negation. Construed in the former way (that is to say, de re) it captures the puzzle of falsehood. The phrase "to think what is not" is notoriously ambiguous between "to think what, in fact, is not" and "to think as not being". First, they may seem to conflate the problem of falsehood with the problem of negation. To the contemporary philosopher, in effect, they are likely to seem to be running together a number of philosophical issues that Frege taught us it was imperative to keep apart. Whatever their maieutic merits, these formulations, which return us to what Kimhi calls "the gate of philosophy" (the Parmenidean puzzles), may appear to be muddled. when nothing corresponds to p? (Wittgenstein 1979: 110-111) How can one wish for a thing that does not happen or hope that something will happen that does not? How can not- p negate p, when p may not be the case, i.e. The same sort of puzzling questions can be asked about each. Thinking, wishing, hoping, believing, and negation all have something in common. ![]() To set it in its proper context, it may help to begin with the following excerpt from a course by Wittgenstein: Irad Kimhi's book is in my view one of the most important books in philosophy to have appeared of late.
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